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PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE
CHILD: THE FORGOTTEN
WOMEN OF IN RE GAULT.*
DAVID S. TANENHAUS**
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s historians of social movements in the United
States have often contrasted the Progressive Era (c. 1890 to 1920) with
the 1960s. Whereas progressive reformers at the turn of the twentieth
century focused on the needs of dependent populations, the rights-
conscious reformers of the 1960s emphasized their constitutional
rights. The post-World War II generation of reformers used litigation
to secure rights for these "prisoners of benevolence" caught in the
social welfare institutions, which the progressives had created half a
century earlier.'
* This article is a revised version of a speech delivered by Professor David S.
Tanenhaus who presented as part of Whittier's Law School's Center for Children's
Rights Distinguished Speaker Series on March 18 'h, 2013.
" Professor and Chair of History and James E. Rogers Professor of History and Law,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I would like to thank Jennifer Mertus and the Center
for Children's Rights for the invitation to participate in the 2013 Distinguished Speaker
Series. It was a great honor to deliver a public lecture at a law school that has such an
enduring commitment to children's rights. I would also like to thank Felice Batlan,
Felicia Kornbluh, Karen Tani, and Mary Wammack for commenting on an early draft
of this article. Special thanks to my mother Gussie Tanenhaus, my sister Beth Winsten,
and my wife Virginia Tanenhaus for encouraging me to say more about the lives of the
women who have been so central to the history of American juvenile justice. Finally,
special thanks to Annette Amdal and Lynette Webber, who took time out of their busy
schedules keeping the UNLV History Department running efficiently, to hear and
comment on the first version of this public lecture
1. See, e.g., WILLARD GAYLIN ET AL., DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE
(Pantheon ed., 1978) (in recent years, historians have revised our understanding social
movements and the development of the American welfare state); See Felicia Kornbluh,
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Scholars of American juvenile justice use this narrative to frame
their field. 2 This overarching narrative is problematic, however,
because it combines a nuanced historical interpretation of the
Progressive Era with a less developed accounting of the Great Society.
The outpouring of scholarship on women, the state, and welfare, for
example, has demonstrated the central roles that women played in the
creation, implementation, and spread of innovative social welfare
policies in the early twentieth century, such as mothers' pensions and
juvenile courts.' Yet the standard account of "the constitutional
domestication of the juvenile court" focuses almost exclusively on the
role that men played as litigators and justices in a trilogy of U.S.
Supreme Court cases, beginning with In re Gault in1967.4 This
landmark case was the first time that the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed what elements of due process the Constitution requires in a
juvenile court proceeding.
In this article, I first draw on my recent book The Constitutional
Rights of Children (2011) to introduce the facts of the case and place
the case in the larger context of the history of American juvenile
justice.' I then focus specifically on the role of four remarkable women
in the history of this landmark decision: Marjorie Gault, Gerald's
mother; Amelia Lewis, Gerald's lawyer; Lorna Lockwood, an Arizona
lawyer who became the first woman to serve as the Chief Justice of a
State Supreme Court; and Getrude "Traute" Mainzer, who assisted in
the litigation of Gerald's case before the U.S. Supreme Court. Focusing
on the role of these women as mothers, children's advocates, lawyers,
Disability, Anti-professionalism, and Civil Rights: The National Federation of the
Blind and the 'Right to Organize' in the 1950s, 97 J. OF AM. HIST. 1023 (2011); See
ANTHONY CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM: JOBS, POLITICS AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1941-1972 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2009) (in addition, scholars, such as the
sociologist Anthony Chen, have highlighted the importance of the immediate post-
World War II era for later developments in the twentieth-century social policy).
2. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT (Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); See also MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S
WRONG WITH CHILDREN's RIGHTS?, (Harvard Univ. Press, 2005).
3. See David S. Tanenahus, The Elusive Juvenile Court: Its Origins, Practices,
and Re-Inventions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE (Barry C. Feld and Donna M. Bishop, eds., 2011).
4. CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE iX
(Univ. Press of Kan., 1998).
5. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: INRE GAULT
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (Univ. Press of Kan., 2011).
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legal researchers, and state actors challenges the conventional
framework for the history of social welfare law. For instance, these
women articulated visions of social justice that challenged the
paternalistic justifications used to legitimate juvenile justice for much
of the twentieth century. They also did not accept the strict
individualistic constitutional based argument of prominent male
lawyers, such as Justice Abe Fortas. Their stories, I believe, suggest
that instead of contrasting the Progressive Era and the 1960s, historians
must pay closer attention to the parallels and continuities between these
two historical eras, including the strikingly similar role of women
reformers in both periods.
Collectively, I will use these women's stories to help to shed light
on how American constitutional law is made by people who challenge
the conventional wisdom or status quo. And I will then conclude with a
few observations about the most recent Supreme Court decisions in the
field of juvenile justice and highlight Justice Elena Kagan's majority
opinion in Miller v. Alabama (2012) that inscribed the political and
biological principle that children are different from adults into
constitutional law.6
II. GAULT IN CONTEXT
The facts of Gault have disturbed audiences for more than forty
years, including the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court who heard
them recited by American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] attorney and
New York University law professor Norman Dorsen. As Dorsen
recounted, on June 8, 1964, the police arrested fifteen-year-old Gerald
Gault and a friend at his home in Globe, Arizona, for allegedly making
an obscene phone call to a neighbor, Mrs. Ora Cook. The police took
Gerald, without informing his parents, to the Children's Detention Home
of the Juvenile Court. A probation officer then filed a delinquent petition
against Gerald. It simply declared that he was "under the age of eighteen
years, and is in need of the protection of this Honorable Court; and that
said minor is a delinquent minor." When Gerald's mother returned from
work that evening, she could not find her son. A few anxious hours later,
she learned from a friend of the family that Gerald had been arrested. She
6. David S. Tanenhaus, The Roberts Court's Liberal Turn on Juvenile Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-roberts-
courts-Iiberal-turn-on-juvenile-justice.html?_r-0 [hereinafter Tanenhaus, The Roberts
Court's].
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went to the Detention Home and was told that her son's hearing would be
held in the Juvenile Court at 3:00 p.m. the following day.
The next day Gerald, along with his mother, appeared before
Judge Robert McGhee of the Juvenile Court. Mrs. Cook, the
complainant, was not there. No one was sworn at this initial hearing.
No transcript or recording was made. No record of the proceedings was
prepared. After the hearing, the judge ordered Gerald returned to the
Detention Home. The next week, Gerald again appeared before Judge
McGhee. Once again, the complainant was not present and no record
of the hearing was kept. After listening to Gerald's account of what
occurred, Judge McGhee declared Gerald a juvenile delinquent and
committed him to Fort Grant until he turned 21 or was discharged. Fort
Grant, the State Industrial State, was a remotely located juvenile boot
camp popularly known in Arizona as "desert Devil's Island." Gerald's
punishment was, in effect, a six-year prison sentence for having
allegedly made an obscene phone call to a woman who never was
called to testify for or against him. If an adult had committed the same
offense, he or she could have been fined between $5 and $50 and could
have been imprisoned for no more than two months. Worse, and unlike
the right of appeal afforded adults, Arizona law permitted no appeals in
juvenile cases.
At that time, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault, like every other
American girl and boy, had no constitutional rights to due process in a
juvenile court proceeding, even though a judge could declare him
"delinquent" and sentence him to be incarcerated in an "industrial
school" until he celebrated his twenty-first birthday. In 1964, the year
that the nation's post-World War II baby boom ended, seventy-one
million Americans (more than 36 percent of the population) were
subject to the jurisdiction of a juvenile court. As FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover testified to Congress, about 4 percent of American youth could
expect to find themselves in juvenile court.'
The U.S. Supreme Court heard Gault near the end of its due
process revolution (1961-1968), which nationalized criminal
procedure. Beginning in 1961, the Warren Court extended protections
in the Bill of Rights, which had previously applied only in federal
courts, to the accused and defendants in state criminal courts. In Gault,
the issue was whether juvenile courts, like adult criminal courts, must
7. TANENHAUS, supra note 5, at xv.
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protect these constitutional rights, such as the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of assistance of counsel. At the same time that the Supreme
Court decided to answer this question, the nation was experiencing an
ostensibly terrifying crime wave and persons under eighteen years of
age were responsible for more than 20 percent of all police arrests and
nearly 50 percent of all arrests for serious offenses. In 1964, juvenile
courts committed 39,511 minors, including Gerald Gault, to juvenile
prisons. Other were prosecuted as adults in the criminal justice system
and sentenced to federal and state penitentiaries. In 1963 alone, for
example, criminal courts sent 88,824 persons younger than eighteen
years of age to adult prison.'
As I argue in my book, Gault is thus much more than a selection
from the canon of American constitutional law. It also invites serious
analysis of tough questions about the appropriate legal response to
youth crime. How should juveniles who break the law be treated?
Should they be tried in the same criminal justice system that prosecutes
and incarcerates adults? Or should their cases instead be handled in a
separate justice system designed specifically for them? Should
adolescents be treated more like young children or more like adults?
Should a fifteen-year-old, for example, be punished the same way as
either a ten-year-old or a thirty-year-old? Should chronological age,
mental capacity, prior record, alleged offense, or life history be
factored into making these decisions?9
As a historical study of a landmark Supreme Court decision, my
book does not provide definitive answers to such normative questions.
Yet, I argue, the past is a valuable place to begin this conversation.
Studying the history of the "juvenile court," which admittedly sounds
like a dusty set piece from a Victorian drama, reminds us that crime
and the state's response to it are legally defined categories of conduct
that have changed dramatically over time. In the American experience,
legislatures have primarily defined what is illegal, and appellate courts
have used specific cases like Gault to define how the state can respond
legally to illegality. Thus, my book examines why states initially
created juvenile courts at the turn of the twentieth century, and how
they operated before and after the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark
8. Id. at xv-xvi.
9. Id. at xvi.
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decision in Gault.10
III. THE WOMEN OF GAULT
I'd like to begin by asking you to imagine an awkward car ride.
On August 1, 1964, Paul and Marjorie Gault drove from their home, a
trailer park in the small mining town of Globe, Arizona, to Sun City, a
retirement community outside of Phoenix. They were scheduled to
meet with Amelia Lewis, a transplanted New Yorker and experienced
attorney, to discuss what had happened to their 15-year-old son, who
had already been incarcerated for six weeks in Fort Grant."
We can only imagine what Gerald's parents were thinking as they
drove to see Lewis. Did they blame themselves (or perhaps each
other?) for what had happened to their son? Was Jerry really going to
spend six years in prison because of a phone call? Could this lawyer
get Jerry released? Could they even afford to pay her?
Lewis, who was born in the Bronx in 1903, graduated from St.
Lawrence Law School (now Brooklyn Law School) and became one of
the few women admitted to the New York bar in the 1920s. She
practiced law in New York City for thirty-three years, was actively
involved in the American Civil Liberties Union, raised three sons, and
moved to Arizona after her husband died in 1957. She passed the
Arizona Bar Examination in 1958, opened her own law practice in Sun
City, and did pro bono work for the local chapter of the ACLU.12
The year that Gerald Gault was incarcerated, 1964, was also the
heyday for legal liberalism. Proponents of this philosophy believed that
courts, especially the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren,
could be used as instruments to bring about meaningful social change
nationwide for historically disadvantaged groups, such as African
Americans, women, and children. Accordingly, the ACLU itself
flourished during the 1960s. Its membership doubled to more than
100,000, local chapters formed in almost every state, and the
organization implemented a new legal strategy. Instead of primarily
filing amicus curiae ("friend of the court") briefs in U.S. Supreme
Court cases to alert the justices to specific issues, the ACLU would
10. Id.
11. Id. at 33.
12. Id.
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directly represent clients like the Gaults."
The Gaults' story horrified Lewis. As a mother who had raised
three boys of her own, she felt for the parents. As a lawyer who
believed strongly in the due process of law, she was outraged by how
arbitrary the juvenile court process was. Lewis agreed to take the case
and had both Paul and Marjorie recount the facts of the case in
affidavits, which Lewis, as a Notary Public, then notarized. She
planned to use these affidavits as the basis for an appeal of the juvenile
court judge's decision.
Lawyers, such as Lewis, help their clients to frame their stories as
legal issues. Gerald Gault's parents' affidavits thus combined legal
concepts with ordinary accounts of their experiences. There are two
striking passages in Marjorie Gault's Affidavit, which I'd like to
highlight. The first described, from Marjorie's perspective, what had
happened to her son during the fateful hearing in judge's chambers:
The petitioner asked the Judge why the complainant, or victim, as
alleged, Mrs. Ora Cook, was not present, to testify. Judge McGhee
informed petitioner that it was not necessary for here to be there . .
. Judge McGhee then ruled that Gerald should be sent to Fort
Grant. Petitioner asked to kiss him goodbye, which the Judge
refused, and told petitioner that she ought to be sent down to Fort
Grant.14
This remarkable of piece of evidence reveals how powerless a
parent could feel in a juvenile court hearing, in which the judge had
autocratic control over his chambers. It also suggested that a mother in
1964 had to be careful not to offend the sensibilities of a male judge in
a small town in Arizona, especially when that same judge could punish
her son.
The second passage suggests that the mother believed that she,
and not Judge McGhee, was in a better position to determine the
appropriate punishment for her son.
Petitioner has consulted with an attorney of the Arizona Civil
Liberties Union now and believes that there is not sufficient
[evidence?] to show her child to be delinquent; she has not
found him anything than an obedient boy who has gotten
into some trouble, not of a serious enough nature for the
13. Id. at 49.
14. Id. at 33.
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punishment meted out to him.
This passage, which blends the voices of Marjorie Gault and
Amelia Lewis, is an example of ordinary folks questioning the
conventional wisdom of official policy and practices.
Yet the law stood in their way. Although Amelia Lewis had
assumed that the Gaults could appeal Judge McGhee's ruling, she soon
learned that Arizona barred appeals in juvenile court cases. Her only
option was to file a habeas corpus petition. A habeas corpus hearing
focuses on the legality of the process by which the individual has been
detained, not on his or her innocence or guilt. For centuries English and
American jurists, including Sir William Blackstone and Chief Justice
John Marshall, had considered habeas corpus the "great writ of
liberty." If a judge determined that a person was being held illegally,
the court would order immediate release of the prisoner.'"
On August 3, Lewis met with Justice Loma Lockwood of the
Arizona Supreme Court, the third woman who played an instrumental,
but forgotten, role in this history, to discuss filing a habeas corpus
petition. Born in Douglas, Arizona, in 1903, Lockwood was the same
age as Lewis. Her father had served on the Arizona Supreme Court
and, perhaps more importantly, had introduced his daughter to Sarah
Herring Sorin. In 1902, Sorin had become the first woman admitted to
the Arizona bar. She practiced mining law in Globe and became the
twenty-fifth woman to argue a case before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Sorin inspired Lorna Lockwood to become a lawyer."
Lockwood graduated from the University of Arizona and in 1925
became the first woman to graduate from the university's law school.
Due to gender discrimination, she had difficulties finding work as a
lawyer and spent fourteen years as a legal stenographer and secretary.
She then formed the first all-woman law practice in the state. In 1939,
she was elected to the Arizona House of Representatives and then
worked as the District Price Attorney for the Office of Price
Administration during World War II. After the war, she returned to the
state legislature. In 1949, she became the first woman to serve as
Assistant Attorney General for Arizona. Two years later, she became
the first woman trial judge in the state. She served for ten years on the
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 34.
17. Id.
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Maricopa County Superior Court and presided over its juvenile
department from 1954 to 1957.11
As a juvenile court judge in Phoenix, Lockwood stressed that the
juvenile court "has a two-fold purpose-to protect human rights and to
enforce human responsibility." She was also concerned about the
conditions of confinement. After inspecting the county juvenile
detention center, Lockwood ordered two iron cells welded shut because
no child should be held in them. She also organized the Arizona
Conference on Crime and Delinquency Prevention and Control and
helped found the Arizona Chapter of Big Brothers and Big Sisters, as
well as a residential treatment center for delinquent girls. 9
In the 1960s, Lockwood continued her pioneering legal career. In
1961, she was first woman elected to the Arizona Supreme Court. Four
years later, she became the first woman in American history to become
chief justice of a state supreme court. In 1967, President Lyndon
Johnson considered nominating her to become the first woman justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Johnson instead selected Thurgood
Marshall, who became the first African American justice.20
When Amelia Lewis met with Justice Lockwood on August 3,
Lewis had not yet prepared a formal habeas corpus petition but
showed her Paul Gault's affidavit. It stated, "Deponent is advised by
his attorney and therefore believes that his said son is being detained
from his parents unlawfully; that his commitment was illegal." The
judge, according to the affidavit, based his finding of delinquency "on
insufficient evidence" and had advised neither Jerry nor his parents of
their right to counsel. In addition, the process was flawed because "no
testimony was taken," the parents did not know what their son had
been charged with, and the victim did not testify. Thus, the court had
deprived the parents of their right to the custody of their son. After
reading the affidavit, Lockwood told Lewis to add only a caption and
that she would accept the "petition in the form of affidavit." She then
called the chief judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court to
arrange for a superior court judge to hold a habeas corpus hearing.2'
Significantly, two accomplished women lawyers had initiated an
ancient legal process that could potentially free a modern adolescent
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 34-35.
21. Id. at 35.
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who may have been imprisoned not for what he allegedly said over the
telephone, but for what his mother had said to a juvenile court judge.
By August 17, the date set for the habeas corpus hearing, Jerry had
already spent more than sixty days at Fort Grant-the maximum
sentence he could have received if he were an adult convicted of
making an obscene phone call. 22
Although I will not describe the habeas hearing in detail, I do
want to emphasize that it provided a forum for Amelia Lewis to
question Judge McGhee, as well as a transcript that the Supreme Court
of the United States would later rely on in its decision. 23 The following
exchange, for example, demonstrated the potential for a juvenile court
judge to abuse his or her power. Since the typical juvenile court
hearing process was so informal and there was no appellate review of
juvenile court cases, Judge McGhee was not accustomed to explaining
his decision-making. He had a difficult time, for example, articulating
how he applied the relevant laws or why he had sent Gerald to Fort
Grant. Lewis began with a straightforward question. "Now, Judge,
would you tell me under what section of, of the code you found the boy
delinquent?" He replied,
Well, there is a-I think it amounts to disturbing the peace. I can't
give you the section, but I can tell you the law, that when one
person uses lewd language in the presence of another person, that
it can amount to-and I consider that when a person makes it over
the phone, that it is considered in the presence, I might be wrong,
that is one section. The other section upon which I consider the
boy delinquent is Section 8-201, Subsection (d), habitually
involved in immoral practice.
Thus, according to McGhee, Jerry had violated two different
laws. The judge, however, emphasized the language in the juvenile
code about being habitually immoral. Lewis then asked, "Judge, would
you tell us the immoral matters in which he was involved in that led
you to the decision?" He replied,
Yes. Yes, I can tell you that. On July-let's see. On July the 2nd,
1962, there was a referral made to our office. Thought it was
not-a referral was made, no follow-up was requested by the
22. Id.
23. See generally id. at 35-39 (for a more comprehensive account of the habeas
hearing).
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Globe Police Department, where the boy had stolen a baseball
glove from another boy and lied to the Police Department about it.
Also....
Lewis interrupted, "Excuse me, was there a hearing held in your
Court on this matter?" McGhee answered, "There was no hearing.
No hearing." Lewis asked, "There was no accusation, then?"
McGhee said, "There was no accusation."24
Despite the informality of the original juvenile court hearing and
the judge's vague answers during the habeas hearing, both the Superior
Court and Arizona Supreme Court ruled that Gerald Gault and his
parents had received adequate due process. Significantly, however,
Lewis's advocacy had laid the foundation for a potential appeal of the
Arizona Supreme Court's decision against her clients to the U.S.
Supreme Court. She then sent all the case files to the New York office
of the ACLU to consider moving forward with an appeal to the
nation's high court.25
At this stage, a fourth woman played an essential role in litigating
the Gault case. On March 16, 1966, the ACLU asked Gertrude
"Traute" Mainzer to work on the jurisdictional statement for Gault.
The statement needed to demonstrate that the Supreme Court had
jurisdiction to hear the appeal and, more importantly, it had to
convince the justices that the case presented a substantial federal
question. Identifying and explicating the substantive constitutional
issues raised by Jerry's case was the critical task at this stage of the
litigation.26
The lawyers who worked on Gault, including Mainzer, had to
explain why this obscure Arizona case mattered for all of the nation's
children and youth subject to the jurisdiction of juvenile courts.
Mainzer brought a unique perspective to the issues involved. 27 She was
born in Germany in 1914 to an intellectual family-her father was one
of the founders of German labor law, a criminal lawyer, and law
professor. After the Nazi seizure of power, Mainzer, her husband, and
two young children (Gabriele and Frank) fled to Holland. After the
24. Id. at 38.
25. Id. at 44.
26. Id. at 49.
27. See Gertrude Mainzer, "WHEN THEY CAME TO TAKE MY FATHER" VOICES OF
THE HOLOCAUST 100-103 (Leona Kahn & Rachel Hager eds., 1996).
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Nazi invaded Holland, her husband was arrested and placed in a prison
in Germany. Eventually, Mainzer and her family had to go into hiding.
For safety's sake, a Christian family took in her children and pretended
that the children were their own. Mainzer herself stayed with another
family, who built a hiding place in a closet for her. She later learned
that her children had been found and arrested. She decided to turn
herself into the authorities even though she risked being sent to
Auschwitz. She had learned, however, if she could prove that she had
relatives in the United States, then she could have her family sent to
Bergen-Belsen instead. Bergen-Belsen was a work camp instead of a
death camp, so there was a chance that she and her two young children
might survive.
After they were liberated from the camp, her family moved to the
United States and Mainzer later graduated from New York University
Law school after World War II. Like Loma Lockwood, however, as a
woman Mainzer could not find work in the private sector. Instead, she
accepted a position as the research consultant for the Arthur Garfield
Hays Civil Liberties Program at New York University's Law School.
Founded in 1958, it was the only legal center in the United States that
focused on civil liberties. Its director, staff, and law students worked
closely with the ACLU, the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, the Congress on Racial Equality, the American
Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Workers
Defense League.28
After reviewing the Gault case file, Mainzer told her boss and
friend Norman Dorsen that Gault raised important constitutional
questions. 29 She not only helped to draft the jurisdictional statement,
but needed to know more about "the conditions at the type of
'Industrial School' in which Gault and others are confined." As
Norman Dorsen explained, "The idea, of course, is to show that the
confinement is not a pleasant sojourn, but has elements of criminal
punishment." It took Mainzer, a Holocaust survivor of Bergen-Belsen,
to suggest that the conditions of imprisonment were significant issues
in the Gault litigation. 0 Mainzer, who later became a family court
judge in New York City, never forgot a lesson she learned during the
Holocaust. "Everybody thinks freedom is something inborn, but it
28. TANENHAUS, supra note 5, at 49-50.
29. Id. at 50.
30. Id. at 68.
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isn't. It is something that has to be taught and experienced." 3 1
Marjorie Gault, Amelia Lewis, Lorna Lockwood, and "Traute"
Maizner all contributed to building a case that forced the U.S. Supreme
Court to consider whether juvenile justice, without adequate due
process safeguards, deprived children of their constitutional rights.
Chief Justice Warren assigned Associate Justice Abe Fortas, who
had a strong interest in social welfare issues, to write the court's
opinion in In re Gault. Drawing on studies of juvenile courts by
leading social scientists that were funded by grants from the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Fortas demonstrated
how much the reality of the administration of juvenile justice in the
1960s contradicted the benevolent rhetoric that had justified its
informal proceedings. This state of affairs led Fortas to conclude that
"Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court."32 Instead, Fortas argued that an adversarial process
similar to how criminal courts were run would help ensure that juvenile
courts discovered the truth and protected an individual's freedom from
arbitrary governmental oppression, while simultaneously not hindering
these courts' ability to rehabilitate youthful offenders.
Thus, the court held that children during the adjudicatory stage of
a juvenile court hearing have the right to notice, counsel, confrontation,
cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-
incrimination. 3 In a congratulatory note to Fortas, Chief Justice
Warren wrote, "I join your magnificent opinion. . . It will be known as
the Magna Carta for juveniles." 34
IV. BEYOND GAULT
The Gault opinion, however, left many questions about children's
constitutional rights unanswered. For example, Gault did not say
whether proof of delinquency must be established by either the
"preponderance of evidence" or the higher standard, "beyond a
reasonable doubt." In 1970, the Court held that the higher standard
must be used (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). In addition, the
Gault court did not address whether the Fifth Amendment's double
31. Mainzer, supra note 27, at 103.
32. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
33. Id. at 1.
34. TANENHAUS, supra note 5, at 85.
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jeopardy clause precluded criminal prosecution of a youth who had
already been found delinquent for the same offense. In 1975, the
Supreme Court held that it did.15
Yet, since Gault, the court has stopped short of granting children
all the same constitutional rights that adults have in criminal court. For
instance, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), the court declared that
children did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile
court. 6 In 1984, the court in Schall v. Martin upheld the
constitutionality of a statute that authorized preventive detention of
juveniles who posed a serious risk of committing a crime before their
trial.3 Thus, juveniles in juvenile court do not have the same right to
bail.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court once again has
begun to grapple with these issues. And, as Terry Maroney has
observed, juvenile justice advocates are on a winning streak, noting:
In the space of the last decade we have seen the courts-most
notably the U.S. Supreme Court-abolish the juvenile death
penalty, severely cut back juvenile life without parole sentences,
and demand greater attention to youths' vulnerability in police
interactions; we also have seen a steady drip of state legislative
measures to return older youth to the juvenile courts. The story of
this era has yet to be told, unfolding as it is around us....
In light of the history that I have recounted in this article, I find it
especially striking that Justice Elena Kagan, a Jewish woman who once
taught law in Chicago during the 1990s, wrote the majority opinion in
Miller v. Alabama (2012), that banned mandatory life sentences
without the possibility of parole for offenders younger than 18. Her
opinion is an emphatic rejection of the "get tough" juvenile justice
policies of the 1980s and 1990s, and it inscribed the principle that
children are different from adults into constitutional law.3 9
35. Breed v. Jones,421 U.S.519, 541 (1975).
36. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
37. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
38. Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE
FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 189 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S.
Tanenhaus eds., NYU Press, 2014).
39. Tanenhaus, The Roberts Court's, supra note 6.
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In conclusion, I would like to end with one of my favorite
passages about American legal history, which was written in 1995.
The study of law can be disappointing at times, a matter of
applying narrow rules and arcane procedure to an uncooperative
reality; a sort of glorified accounting that serves to regulate the
affairs of those who have power-and that all too often seeks to
explain, to those who do not, the ultimate wisdom and justness of
their condition. But that's not all the law is. The law is also a
memory; the law also records a long-running conversation, a
nation arguing with its conscience. 40
As it turns out, the author of that passage also taught law in
Chicago during the 1990s. He later nominated Elena Kagan to serve on
the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Gault case and more recent decisions, such as Miller v.
Alabama, I believe, are part of that long-running conversation about
who we are.
40. BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND
INHERITANCE 437 (Broadway Books, 2004).
